Abstract. This paper describes related key attacks on five and six round KASUMI. The five round attack requires the encryption of approximately 2
KASUMI
KASUMI shares with MISTY1 the design goals of having a numerical basis for its security and of being sufficiently fast when implemented in hardware. More details of the design rationale of KASUMI can be found in [1] . To meet the first goal, the design of KASUMI is based on the theory of provable security of block ciphers against linear and differential cryptanalysis introduced by Nyberg and Knudsen [8] [9] . To meet the second design goal, both the S-boxes and the key schedule were carefully chosen to optimize the hardware performance.
KASUMI is an eight round Fiestel type cipher. Each round is made up of an F L function and an F O function. In odd numbered rounds the F L function precedes the F O function, whereas in even numbered rounds the F O function precedes the F L function. The F L function is a simple function that is linear for a fixed key. The F O function contains the non-linearity in each round. The F O function is made up from three F I functions, which in turn are made up from two applications of two different S-boxes and a key addition. The S-boxes are chosen to have optimal resistance to linear and differential cryptanalysis. The overall structure is shown in Figure 1 .
KASUMI has a simple, linear key schedule in order to make the hardware significantly smaller and to reduce key set-up time. Every bit of the key is used once in every round. For the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to consider every ith round key as being made up of three parts KL i , KO i and KI i . These in turn are divided into a total of eight 16-bit parts such that 3 , where denotes concatenation. The KI i,j are further divided into two parts (first one of seven bits, second of nine) with KI i,j = KI i,j,1 KI i,j,2 . The round keys are derived by splitting the key K into eight 16-bits parts K 1 · · · K 8 . Each part of the key is used to derive exactly one round key part in each round. The key schedule has the property that changing one bit of K changes exactly one key bit of each round key.
Four Round Differentials of KASUMI
This section describes a family of four round differentials that can be used to attack up to six rounds of KASUMI. The core idea behind this family of differentials is to choose small key differences and control the effect of these differences as they progress through the cipher using either the properties of the F L function or appropriately chosen plaintext differences.
The differential is formed by encrypting plaintexts X and X * under keys K and K * respectively, where (k) , where wt(k) is the number of non-zero bits of k, the output difference at the end of the fourth round is c(k <<< 5)0 16 , where c is any 32 bit string. In practice, k is chosen such that wt(k) = 1 in order to maximize the probability of the differential holding. The following paragraph provides more detail as to why the differential works.
If K and K * are as defined above, then the only non zero round key part differences in the first three rounds are ∆KL 1,2 = k, ∆KO 2,1 = k <<< 5 and ∆KL 3,1 = k <<< 1. Now, the F L function has the property that for any key KL, an input of 0 16 1 16 always gives an output of 1 32 . Hence when encrypting plaintexts X and X * as defined above under keys K and K * respectively, the input and output differences of F L1 are both 0 32 . The round key difference in the second round combines with the difference in the right hand side of the plaintexts such that the output difference of F O2 is always 0 32 . Since the input difference to F L3 is 0 32 , and the AND of a message bit and key bit is always zero when the message bit is zero, the difference in the third round key has no effect on the output of F L3 with probability 2 −wt(k) . Therefore, with probability 2 −wt(k) the output difference at the end of the fourth round is c(k <<< 5)0 16 . Figure 2 illustrates this family of four round differentials over six round KA-SUMI.
Note that the restriction on the inputs to F L1 to always be of the form 0 16 1 16 is stronger than necessary when wt(k) < 16, but is defined this way for simplicity.
An Attack on Five Round KASUMI
This section describes a related key attack on five round KASUMI. The attack requires an average of 2 15 chosen plaintext encryptions under the original key and 2
19 chosen plaintext encryptions under a chosen related key. The attack is expected to recover the entire key in a maximum of a little over 2 33 trials, where each trial is equivalent to approximately 1·6 five round KASUMI encryptions.
When encrypting a plaintext pair X and X * under keys K and K * respectively, where X, X * , K and K * are as described in Section 3, with probability 2
where c is any 32 bit string, e is any 16 bit string and g = e ⊕ (k <<< 5). When wt(k) = 1 the attack requires an average of eight ciphertext pairs of this form, and six ciphertext pairs whose inputs are of this form but whose output difference can be of any form. It is expected that these ciphertext pairs can be found from a set of 2 19 ciphertext pairs generated from inputs of the appropriate form. One method of generating this set is to obtain the encryptions of 2 15 chosen plaintexts under the key K and for each such encryption obtain the sixteen related encryptions that result from using the different values of k such that wt(k) = 1. Note that with K and K * as defined above, the only non zero round key part difference in round five is ∆KO 5,3 = k <<< 13. Note also that the rightmost 32 bits of the plaintexts do not need to be known.
The attack assumes that the eight ciphertext pairs whose output differences are of the correct form all satisfy the differential described in Section 3. Consequently, for each of these eight ciphertext pairs it follows that the output difference of F O5 is ge ⊕ (k <<< 5)0 16 = ee, so that the output difference of F I53 is e ⊕ e = 0 16 . Since ∆KI 5,3 = 0 16 , the input difference to F I53 is also zero. Therefore, as ∆KO 5,3 = k <<< 13, the output difference of F I52 is e ⊕ (k <<< 13). Furthermore, for each guess of KL 5,1 and KO 5,2 , the inputs to F I52 are known. Hence, for each ciphertext pair, the difference tables of S7 and S9 can be used to suggest values of KI 5,2 .
For each guess of KL 5,1 and KO 5,2 , a count is made of the number of times each possible value of KI 5,2 is suggested by a ciphertext pair. The number of times a key KI 5,2 is suggested for a particular choice of KL 5,1 and KO 5 
Any key triple suggested as many as four times is kept.
The correct value of the triple KL 5,1 , KO 5,2 and KI 5,2 will be included in the values suggested by each of the ciphertext pairs that do genuinely follow the differential of Section 3. Such pairs are referred to as right pairs. Since it is expected that four of the eight pairs satisfy the differential, the correct value of the triple KL 5,1 , KO 5,2 and KI 5,2 is expected to be suggested at least four times. The probability of an incorrect triple being suggested by one ciphertext pair is 2 −16 , and the probability of an incorrect triple being suggested as many as four times is less than 2 −57 . Therefore, the probability that at least one incorrect triple is suggested as many as four times is less than 2 −9 . Thus the correct triple KL 5,1 , KO 5,2 and KI 5,2 is expected to be uniquely identified. This requires one round of KASUMI to be unwound for each choice of values for KI 5,1 and KO 5,2 and each of the eight differential pairs. Hence the work factor is equivalent to at most 1.6 × 2 32 five round KASUMI encryptions. Once the subkey KL 5,1 has been recovered, the sixteen rightmost bits h of the input difference to F O5 are known for each ciphertext pair. Therefore for each right pair the output difference (k <<< 13)⊕h of F I51 is known. Guessing the subkeys KL 5 Note that if all four right pairs have identical bit values in one or more common locations within the leftmost sixteen bits of the ciphertexts then there are at least two key pairs KL 5,1 and KO 5,2 giving the correct input values to F I52 for all four right pairs. A similar property applies to KL 5,2 and KO 5,1 . Hence with probability ≈ 0.22 the correct key will not be uniquely identified. However, the attack is easily modified to cope with such an event, and the expected impact on running time is minimal.
This attack was implemented on a 400 Mhz Alpha and took approximately five hours to complete.
An Attack on Six Round KASUMI
This section describes a related key attack on six round KASUMI. The idea behind the attack is to obtain ciphertext pairs with a property such that it is possible to work back through round six without having to guess all of the round six round key bits, then use round five and the differential of Section 3 to suggest values for the missing key bits, and finally to use round four to help eliminate incorrect values for the key. The attack requires the encryption of on average 3 × 2 13 chosen plaintexts under the original key and 3 × 2 17 chosen plaintexts under a chosen related key, and is expected to recover the entire key in a maximum of 2 112 trials, equivalent to 1·5×2 113 six round KASUMI encryptions.
When encrypting plaintexts X and X * under keys K and K * respectively, where X, X * , K and K * are as described in Section 3, with probability 2
the ciphertext difference is Y ⊕ Y * = nge, where n is any 32-bit string, g is any 16-bit string and e = k <<< 8. When wt(k) = 1 the attack requires an average of six ciphertext pairs of this form, and it is expected that these ciphertext pairs can be found from a set of 3 × 2 17 ciphertext pairs generated from inputs of the appropriate form. One method of generating this set is to obtain 2 15 chosen plaintext encryptions under the key K and for each such encryption obtain the sixteen related encryptions that result from using the different values of k such that wt(k) = 1. Note that with K and K * as defined above, the only non zero round key part differences in rounds five and six are ∆KO 5,3 = k <<< 13 and ∆KO 6,2 = k <<< 8. Note also that the rightmost 32 bits of the plaintexts do not need to be known.
Note that for each of the six ciphertext pairs, the input difference to F I62 is 0 16 , since ∆KO 6,2 = k <<< 8 = e. As ∆KI 6,2 = 0 16 , the output difference of F I62 is also 0 16 , so that there are only 2 16 possible outputs of F I62 for each pair. Therefore, if the 16-bit output t of F I62 is known for any of these ciphertext pairs, it is not necessary to know the round keys KO 6,2 and KI 6,2 in order to compute the output of round six.
The attack guesses the ninety six key bits KL 6 , KO 6,1 , KO 6,3 , KI 6,1 and KI 6, 3 (so that the only unknown parts of the fifth round key are KI 5,1 and KO 5,3 ), and then takes each possible value of the string t in turn and assumes it to be the output of F I62 for all six ciphertext pairs. These values are then used along with the ciphertext values to compute the input values of F I51 and the output values of F I52 for all ciphertext pairs. The attack then assumes that all ciphertext pairs follow the differential of Section 3. This enables the output difference of F I51 to be computed for each ciphertext pair. The difference tables of S7 and S9 can then be used to suggest values for KI 5, 1 . Note that key bits must be suggested by both S7 and S9 in order for a value to be suggested for KI 5,1 . On average one value of KI 5,1 will be suggested by each ciphertext pair.
Each value of KI 5,1 suggested by a ciphertext pair is then used to compute the two outputs of F I51 for that pair. These outputs are then XORed with the sixteen rightmost input bits to F O5 and the resulting values used along with the output difference (k <<< 5) ⊕ (k <<< 8) ⊕ g of F I53 to suggest values for KO 5, 3 by considering F I53 as a key dependent S-box, since the key KI 5, 3 is equivalent to the already guessed key KO 6, 3 . On average one value of KO 5,3 will be suggested by each ciphertext pair.
If values are suggested for both KI 5,1 and KO 5,3 then each suggested pair KI 5,1 , KO 5,3 is used along with the ninety six guessed key bits to compute from the two ciphertext values the output difference of F L4. If this output difference is equal to the input difference to F L5 then the pair KI 5,1 , KO 5,3 is checked against a list of possible values for the key pair suggested already by that ciphertext pair for different values of t but the same value of the ninety six key bits KL 6 , KO 6,1 , KO 6,3 , KI 6,1 and KI 6,3 and, if not already there, added to the list. If the suggested key pair already appears in the list, then it should not be added again. This is to prevent the same key pair being suggested more than once by a given ciphertext pair and value of KL 6 , KO 6,1 , KO 6,3 , KI 6,1 and KI 6, 3 . The probability of wrong keys generating the correct output difference of F L4 is 2 −32 . It is expected that three of the six ciphertext pairs follow the differential of Section 3. Therefore, taking the number of times a pair KI 5,1 , KO 5,3 (equivalently KO 6,2 , KI 6,2 ) is suggested for a particular choice of KL 6 , KO 6,1 , KO 6,3 , KI 6,1 and KI 6,3 as the number of times the key KL 6 , KO 6 and KI 6 is suggested, the correct value of the key KL 6 , KO 6 and KI 6 is expected to be suggested at least three times. An incorrect key has probability 2 −64 of being suggested by any one particular ciphertext pair and value of t, so that the probability of an incorrect key being suggested by any one particular pair is less than 2 −48 . Therefore, the probability that an incorrect key is suggested by at least three out of the six pairs is less than 2 −139 , and the probability that at least one incorrect key is suggested as many as three times is less than 2 −11 . It is therefore expected that the correct key is the only key to be suggested as many as three times.
Conclusion
This paper describes related key attacks on both five and six round KASUMI. Under the assumption that it is possible to obtain the encryptions of approximately 2 19 chosen plaintext pairs X and X * under keys K and K * respectively, where K and K * differ in only one bit, the five round attack is practical in terms of computing power. The six round attack, while requiring fewer chosen plaintext encryptions than the five round attack, is of theoretical interest only due to the computing power required to implement the attack.
The attacks described above both rely on the same differential that predicts differences at the end of the third round with probability one half. This differential arises from the use of a very simple key schedule and the locations of where round key parts dependent upon K 3 are fed into the first three rounds. Changing the locations of where these round key parts are fed into the rounds may destroy this particular differential, but doesn't necessarily eliminate the possibility of constructing similar differentials.
Note that the attacks described in this paper present no real security threat to KASUMI as used in 3GPP as firstly they are only valid against reduced round variants of KASUMI, and secondly they require plaintexts to be encrypted under related keys in a way that should not be possible within the 3GPP environment.
